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COLLATERAL DAMAGE: 
THE IMPACT OF ACTA AND THE ENFORCEMENT 
AGENDA ON THE WORLD'S POOREST PEOPLE 
 
Andrew Rens1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
ACTA is billed as a trade agreement, and it is likely to have a far reaching 
impact on the poorest people in the world.  ACTA's purported aim is to 
increase the efficacy of enforcement of intellectual property.  However, like 
the enforcement agenda that gave rise to it, ACTA's provisions threaten 
access to medicines, access to learning materials, and access to markets by 
developing countries, and in so doing threaten development. 
 
                                                 
1
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
More than 1.4 billion people in the world live below the poverty line 
defined by the World Bank, of 1.25 U.S. dollars a day.
2
  People living at or 
below the poverty line are vulnerable to disease, starvation and the natural 
elements and are deprived of medicines, knowledge and power over the 
international laws and economic dispositions that affect their daily lives.  
What does this have to do with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA), currently the subject of secretive negotiations by the United 
States, Europe and a few close allies?  ACTA is, after all, described by its 
advocates as a trade agreement.  However, little attention has been paid to 
its potential impact on the world’s poorest people.  This article points to 
some of the ways in which ACTA will almost certainly threaten the world's 
poorest people. 
ACTA itself is part of a far bigger agenda:  the “enforcement agenda.”  
The enforcement agenda, taking the guise of strengthening the enforcement 
of existing rights, attempts to enact national laws and to create policies and 
practises that effectively eliminate existing limitations and exceptions in the 
current international intellectual property regime, at least as far as cross 
                                                 
2
 Shaohua Chen & Martin Ravallion, The Developing World Is Poorer Than We Thought, 
But No Less Successful in the Fight against Poverty 35 (Development Research Group, 
World Bank, August 2008), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/JAPANINJAPANESEEXT/Resources/515497-
1201490097949/080827_The_Developing_World_is_Poorer_than_we_Thought.pdf.blic 
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border regulation of intellectual property is concerned.  ACTA is the pre-
eminent vehicle of the enforcement agenda.  Developing countries have had 
a number of recent experiences with the enforcement agenda.  These 
experiences provide concrete examples of the likely impact of ACTA.  This 
article sets out to describe in plain terms the likely impact of ACTA on the 
world's poor.  Doing so requires an understanding of the enforcement 
agenda and its primary vehicle—ACTA—which requires drawing on a 
great deal of work by others, some if it still in progress.  This paper 
describes ACTA as both a process and set of provisions, examines its 
emergence in the enforcement agenda, and discusses how ACTA threatens 
multinational development, especially access to medicines and access to 
knowledge. 
 
II. WHAT IS AT STAKE? 
 
At one time intellectual property law was viewed by both the public in 
the developed world and by most developing country policy makers as a 
purely technocratic domain.  Reliance on expertise effectively disguised 
political choices.  While this view has changed, it is too often forgotten that 
intellectual property laws disproportionately impact the world's poorest 
people.  How will the enforcement agenda affect the lives of the world’s 
poorest people?  Will it fracture the multinational intellectual property 
regime?  Will it derail international co-operation on health, on renewable 
energy, and on food security?   
 
III. THE ENFORCEMENT AGENDA 
 
The “enforcement agenda” is a sustained, wide-ranging effort by 
lobbyists for certain industries in crisis to deploy state resources, secure 
legislation, and institutionalize practises that support their current business 
models under the banner of enforcing intellectual property rights.  “The 
overall picture that emerges is a web of numerous multilateral forums, 
regional and bilateral agreements and unilateral institutions being captured 
to pursue a global TRIPS-plus enforcement agenda.”
3
 
The agenda is being realized through a range of means; ACTA, 
increasingly onerous enforcement provisions in Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs),
4
 far reaching national legislation on “counterfeits” (often the results 
                                                 
3
 Viviana Muñoz Tellez, The Changing Global Governance of Intellectual Property 
Enforcement:  A New Challenge for Developing Countries, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ENFORCEMENT:  INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 10 (Li &Correa eds. 2009). 
4
 “Free Trade Agreements” is the name of a type of bi-lateral trade agreement that is not, 
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of “expert technical assistance”) and a cohort of other means.  Muñoz 
Tellez lists thirteen different international fora where enforcement efforts 
are being pursued.
5
 
The enforcement agenda is being set by multinational tobacco, 
pharmaceutical, film and record corporations.  The Global Business 
Leaders’ Alliance Against Counterfeiting (GBLAAC), whose members 
include Coca-Cola, Daimler Chrysler, Pfizer, Proctor and Gamble, 
American Tobacco, Phillip Morris, Swiss Watch, Nike, and Canon, 
sponsored the meeting held in Geneva hosted by Interpol and WIPO on 
counterfeiting which appears to have begun the public ACTA process
6
.  The 
primary lobbying bodies appear to be the Motion Picture Association, the 
Recording Industry Association of America, the International Intellectual 
Property Alliance, and the Business Software Alliance, global 
pharmaceutical giants, and global tobacco companies
7
. 
Significant features of the agenda are that it seeks to reduce or eliminate 
exceptions and limitations to intellectual property law through over-broad 
provisions purportedly aimed at infringement.  Examples from East Africa 
will be used to illustrate this effect.  The enforcement agenda seeks to move 
the focus of international and national intellectual property policy away 
from efforts to reform intellectual property laws to ensure access to 
medicines and access to knowledge and instead to dedicate resources to 
expanding the reach and impact of the statutory monopolies granted by 
intellectual property legislation.  The enforcement agenda is often framed in 
terms of security, which justifies inroads into civil liberties, recruits new 
constituencies to the political economy of intellectual property 
maximization, and attempts to stigmatize critics.
8
  As the enforcement 
agenda unfolds across a range of arenas, the impact on real life situations by 
the agenda becomes all too clear; presaging the impact of ACTA. 
 
IV. ACTA  
 
                                                                                                                            
however, confined to trade as traditionally understood, but includes requirements for 
changes to the national legislation of signatories, most notably intellectual property 
legislation. 
5
 Muñoz Tellez, supra note 3. 
6
 Aaron Shaw, The Problem with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (and What To 
Do About It), KE STUDIES (2008), http://kestudies.org/ojs/index.php/kes/article/view/34/57. 
7
 A peculiar difficulty attends ACTA with respect to both the text and the process:   the text 
has been withheld from the public, and largely from the public's duly appointed 
representatives, and that the negotiations do not take place on the public record. 
8
 Susan K. Sell, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy 
Enforcement Efforts: the State of Play 4 (IQsensato, Occasional Paper No. 1, June 9, 2008), 
available at http://www.iqsensato.org/wp-
content/uploads/Sell_IP_Enforcement_State_of_Play-OPs_1_June_2008.pdf. 
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What is ACTA?  Although the few official government announcements 
on ACTA have described it as a draft treaty agreement, for developing 
countries it is another arena of conflict in an immensely complex strategy of 
forum shifting by certain multinational corporations.  Susan Sell describes 
the process as the latest iteration in a longer process: 
 
Since the early 1980s advocates of a maximalist IP agenda 
have shifted forums both horizontally and vertically in order to 
achieve their goals.  Those who seek to ration access to IP are 
engaged in an elaborate cat and mouse game with those who 
seek to expand access.  As soon as one venue becomes less 
responsive to a high protectionist agenda, IP protectionists shift 
to another in search of a more hospitable venue. . . .
9
 
 
Sell describes how those seeking ever increasing intellectual property rights 
shifted forum from the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) to 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and then back to WIPO
10
, and then to 
bi-lateral trade agreements, and the multiple other fora. 
 
A. The ACTA Process 
 
ACTA is being negotiated by trade representatives from the United 
States, Australia, Canada, the European Commission, Japan, Mexico, 
Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea.  Official statements 
by negotiators such as the European Trade Commission claim that ACTA 
“does not purport to create new intellectual property rights but to create 
improved international standards as to how to act against large-scale 
infringements of IPR”
11
  Despite this claim, ACTA provisions stipulate 
penalties for non-commercial infringement, impose liability on a wide range 
                                                 
9
 Id. at 5. 
10
 Id. (“Once the access to medicines coalition of developing countries and NGOs 
mobilized in the WTO, the IP maximalists renewed their earlier WIPO deliberations on a 
Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) in an effort to secure IP protection that went beyond 
TRIPS. However, the mobilized medicines coalition paid attention to WIPO and tried to 
counter this quest with a Development Agenda for WIPO. The ensuing stalemate at WIPO 
over the SPLT led the IP maximalists to pursue other avenues, including continued bilateral 
and regional trade and investment treaties marked by TRIPS-Plus provisions as well as this 
new pluri-lateral effort behind the IP enforcement agenda. Industry has been relentless 
pursuing its IP agenda and circumventing developing country and NGO opposition, 
favoring non-transparent forums of ‘like-minded’ actors.”) 
11
 European Commission Trade Office, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) Fact 
Sheet (November 2008), available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/october/tradoc_140836.11.08.pdf [hereinafter 
ACTA Fact Sheet]. 
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of third parties, create new categories of rights, and effectively eliminate 
exceptions and limitations granted by TRIPS.  ACTA is sometimes 
presented as a tough but practical means by some states to secure their trade 
interests in economically difficult times.  The reality is more complex: 
 
The main actors in the ACTA process are “nodal actors” or 
networks of state and private sector actors who coordinate their 
positions and enroll nodal actors to help the cause.  These are 
not single issue coalitions of states, but rather a mélange of 
private and public sector actors who share compatible goals 
and continue to coordinate their negotiating positions over time 
and across forums.
12
  
 
ACTA is being created outside all of the existing multinational 
organisations and is intended to create a new international organization.  
Once the provisions have been settled, it is intended that they will be 
applied to developing countries, especially emerging economies.  
According to the European Commission Trade Office:  “[t]he ultimate 
objective is that large emerging economies, where IPR enforcement could 
be improved, such as China or Russia, will sign up to the global pact.”
13
  
Although official notification of a process that led to ACTA was first given 
in 2007, it was only on 21 April 2010 that an official draft of ACTA was 
made public, and then only after widespread protest and leaking of previous 
drafts.
14
 
 
B. ACTA Provisions  
 
Any discussion of provisions of ACTA, or putative provisions suffers 
from the secrecy of the process.  At the time of writing only three public 
drafts have been released and two of those have been redacted.  The third, 
distributed in October 2010, purported to require no further negotiations but 
is indeterminate in key respects.  
Even though negotiations have apparently concluded in the eleventh 
“final” round the text released from that round is labeled “Predecisional/ 
Deliberative.”  Further deliberations are remains hidden from public 
                                                 
12
 Sell, supra note 8, at 5–6.  Sell derives the term “nodal actors” from Peter Drahos, Four 
Lessons for Developing Countries from the Trade Negotiations over access to Medicines, 
28 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 11, 35 (2007). 
13
 ACTA Fact Sheet, supra note 11. 
14
 The Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property (PIJIP) at the American 
University Washington College of Law provides a webpage that hosts various leaked and 
released versions of the drafting text.  See https://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta. 
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scrutiny.  It is therefore the potential rupture zone around each provision 
rather than the precise wording of provisions which requires attention.  The 
secretive process and textual indeterminacy may still result in the re-writing 
of the provisions or the (re) introduction of other more onerous provisions.  
In addition, as the interception of medicines by the Dutch customs 
authorities discussed later in this article shows, the nuances of legislative 
drafting are disregarded when government officials act at the behest of 
alleged rights holders.  
The first chapter of the text sets out initial provisions and definitions.  
Several key definitions have been introduced only in the October 2010 
version of the text.
15
  The second chapter sets out provisions which require 
changes to national laws.  The second section of the second chapter which 
is on civil enforcement binds states to grant peculiar categories of civil 
penalty to claimants that consists of awards for unproven loss, entitled “pre-
established” and “special” damages.
16
  The same article requires a 
presumption in respect of damages for copyright works.  One such 
presumption is that damages presumed to be equal to an amount calculated 
by multiplying the profit that the plaintiff would earn on authorized copies 
by the number of unauthorized copies.  The presumption requires the 
logically fallacious conclusion that every infringing copy distributed is 
equivalent to a lost sale.  The conclusion is false because the infringing 
copy would not necessarily be sold by a guilty defendant at the same price 
as the plaintiff.  The defendant would sell for less than the plaintiff's price 
so as to make sales to those for whom the plaintiff's price is too high, 
therefore sales to persons who wouldn't or couldn't buy at plaintiff's price 
are not sales lost by the plaintiff due to the defendant's actions.
17
  In this 
section ACTA seeks to overturn the basic economic principle that as prices 
rise demand decreases by fiat. 
The section also requires courts to grant injunctions without hearing the 
other party in certain circumstances
18
 and to require alleged infringer's to 
give information about other parties without allegations of infringement 
having first been proved.
19
  These procedural requirements disregard the 
                                                 
15
 For the first time in the ACTA process “counterfeit trademark goods” and “pirated 
copyright goods” are defined in the text. 
16
 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Consolidated Text:  Oct. 2, 2010, Ch. 2, Art. 2 (3), 
PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE, http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow 
“Official Text - October 2, 2010” hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA Text – October 2010].  
17
 States v. Dove, _ F.Supp.2d _, 2008 WL 4829881 (W.D. Va., Nov. 7, 2008) (“It is a basic 
principle of economics that as price increases, demand decreases.  Customers who 
download music and movies for free would not necessarily spend money to acquire the 
same product.”). 
18
 ACTA Text – October 2010, supra note 16, ch. 2, § 2, art. 2.4. 
19
 Id. ch. 2, § 2, art. 2.5. 
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competence of courts to regulate issues of their own procedure, especially 
the granting of injunctions, in common law countries.  Interference in the 
constitutional separation of powers is generally regarded as well beyond the 
ambit of trade agreements. 
The third section of chapter two, dealing with so-called border 
measures, was designated in previous version of the agreement as applying 
to all the rights listed in the TRIPS agreement; trademarks, patents, 
copyrights, data protection, integrated circuit protections, trade secrets and 
geographical indications:  “For the purposes of this section, ‘goods 
infringing an intellectual property right’ means goods infringing any of the 
intellectual property rights covered by TRIPS.”  In an apparent response to 
widely raised concerns about access to medicines, the October consolidated 
text states in a footnote “For the purpose of this Agreement, Parties agree 
that patents do not fall within the scope of this Section.” 
Customs authorities are mandated to seize goods suspected of being 
infringing goods.  Customs officials are therefore granted quasi-judicial 
powers to decide complex matters of intellectual property law which they 
are ill suited to exercise.  Customs officials are also required to give 
detailed information about goods in transit to rights holders.  Confidential 
commercial information, usually disclosed to customs officials for taxation 
and excise purposes will be disclosed to commercial competitors who 
purport to be “rights holders” either prior to or after seizure.  Customs 
officials are also to destroy goods without a judicial hearing.  
Border measures apply to the novel category of “counterfeit trademark 
goods,” defined as “any goods, including packaging, bearing without 
authorization a trademark that is identical to the trademark validly 
registered in respect of such goods, or that cannot be distinguished in its 
essential aspects from such a trademark, and that thereby infringes the 
rights of the owner of the trademark in question under the law of the 
country in which the procedures set out in Section 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Chapter 2 
are invoked.”  Since border measures apply to goods in transit this 
effectively grants trademark holders a new right, the right to prevent the 
transit of goods through a country in which they are not offered for sale.  
The consequence of this is to substantially change trademark law in most 
jurisdictions that require that goods be offered by way of trade in the 
jurisdiction, and that usually reserve penalties, such as the forfeiture and 
destruction of goods to courts, and then often only when intention is proved. 
Section 4 entitled “Criminal Enforcement” requires imprisonment as a 
possible sentence for infringement.  The fifth section deals with what it 
terms the “digital environment” and requires laws that require service 
providers to remove allegedly infringing content on notice from purported 
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rights holders.
20
  Service providers are also required to provide information 
about third parties, including commercially confidential and private and 
personal information, to purported rights holders alleging infringement.  
The section makes use of an ambivalent term, “adequate legal protection 
and effective legal remedies,” which leaves considerable for proponents of 
the enforcement agenda to insist that these include criminal sanctions.  
The third chapter entitled 'Enforcement Practices' requires states to 
commit resources to create specialized expertise on intellectual property 
enforcement, and to convince their populations of the importance of 
intellectual property as currently configured.  States would thus enter into 
mutually binding obligations to use state resources to create national 
political economies dedicated to maintaining the status quo to be 
established by ACTA, limiting their national sovereignty to adapt 
intellectual property law to changes in technology. 
The fourth chapter places obligations for international co-operation, 
information sharing and capacity building in making ACTA operational on 
participating states.  Participating states are required to dedicate resources to 
extending ACTA to other states in co-operation with the private actors 
whose interests ACTA serves.
21
  Chapter five creates a new multinational 
organization in all but name, consisting of a committee, which can control 
its own procedures, and sub-committees are which are empowered to 
involve non governmental bodies at will in their processes.  The chapter 
creates a mandatory consultation procedure that purports to oust the 
operation of the World Trade Organization's Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.  The sixth and final 
chapter sets out the procedure for the signature and entry into force of the 
                                                 
20
 The required notice and take down provisions are reminiscent of the United States 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). 
21
 ACTA Text – October 2010, supra note 16, ch. 4, art. 4.3 provides:  "1. Each Party shall 
endeavor to provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, assistance in 
capacity building and technical assistance in improving enforcement of intellectual 
property rights for Parties to this Agreement and, where appropriate, for prospective Parties 
to this Agreement. Such capacity building and technical assistance may cover such areas 
as:   
 (a) enhancement of public awareness on intellectual property rights;  
 (b) development and implementation of national legislation related to enforcement of 
intellectual property rights;  
 (c) training of officials on enforcement of intellectual property rights; and  
 (d) coordinated operations conducted at the regional and multilateral levels. 
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, each Party shall endeavor to work closely with other 
Parties and, where appropriate, countries or separate customs territories not a Party to this 
Agreement. 
3. Each Party may undertake the activities described in this Article in conjunction with 
relevant private sector or international organizations. Each Party shall strive to avoid 
unnecessary duplication of the activities described in this Article with respect to other 
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proposed treaty. 
 
V. THE CONSTRUCTION OF COUNTERFEITING 
 
The use of the term “piracy” in reference to copyright has historically 
taken place outside of legal discourse, in rhetorical efforts by interests 
groups seeking changes in the law or public perception.  The term as 
applied to copyright has not had a clear legal meaning.
22
  Earlier texts of 
ACTA used the term in reference to some kind of infringement, without 
defining it.  The appearance of a vague rhetorical term as a central term in a 
draft international instrument signals that the text is written entirely from 
the perspective of the interest group that uses the term, if not by that group.  
The term “piracy” is used in parallel with the term “counterfeit” in the 
enforcement agenda and the text of ACTA.  The October consolidated text 
defines “pirated copyright goods” as “any goods that are copies made 
without the consent of the right holder or person duly authorized by the 
right holder in the country of production and that are made directly or 
indirectly from an article where the making of that copy would have 
constituted an infringement of a copyright or a related right under the law of 
the country in which the procedures set out in Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of 
Chapter 2 are invoked.” 
The procedures referred to in the definition refer to obligations to 
provide injunctions including those given without hearing the defendant, 
damages and the destruction of property without compensation, and 
requiring third parties to furnish information. 
“Counterfeit” has historically borne a number of legal meanings, one of 
which is indicating large scale production and sale of goods that bear an 
intentionally deceptive resemblance to trademarked goods, while others 
relate to the integrity of state issued currency.  As the East African 
experience recounted shows, the term is being used in the pursuance of the 
enforcement agenda not only to refer to goods subject to copyright, patents 
and other intellectual property rights, but also to constitute otherwise non-
infringing conduct as an infringement, in some cases criminal infringement.  
The term “counterfeit trademark goods” is defined in the October 
consolidated text of ACTA;
 23
 however, the term “counterfeit” is not. 
                                                                                                                            
international efforts." 
22
 PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM:  WHO OWNS THE 
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 28 (2002); ANTHEA WORSDALL & ANDREW CLARK, ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING:  A PRACTICAL GUIDE 1 (1998) 1; Debora Halbert, Intellectual Property 
Piracy:  The Narrative Construction of Deviance, 10 Int’l J. for the Semiotics of Law 55 
(1997). 
23
 ACTA Text – October 2010, supra note 16 (“[C]ounterfeit trademark goods means any 
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The use of “counterfeit” in the title of ACTA raises doubt whether the 
term is intended to refer only to trademarked goods or to goods subject to 
patents, and other forms of intellectual property, especially since the 
agreement is according to the October consolidated text intended to apply to 
a wide variety of forms of intellectual property.  “Counterfeit” as used in 
the title and preamble is invested with a vague but ominous meaning in 
order to homogenize a heterogeneous set of regulations and practices, which 
in turn are the implementations of objectives of the network of private and 
state actors who have constructed the enforcement agenda. 
The enforcement agenda appears to have been precipitated by the 
adoption by WIPO of an agenda focusing on development.
24
  The rights 
language employed by the access to medicines and access to knowledge 
movements rendered the putative technocratic language of “minimum 
standards,” which had previously been deployed to maximize intellectual 
property rights, less effective.  The terms “counterfeiting” and 
“enforcement” were therefore mobilised to invoke the language of security 
in an era in which democratic governments in developed countries have 
exhibited a tendency to allow security to trump human rights. 
 
VI. THREATENED EFFECTS OF ACTA ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
A. Negating Multinational Development 
 
The immediate effect of ACTA, even before pressure is brought to bear 
on developing countries, is the exclusion of most developing countries from 
international decision making.  It is thus a means of circumventing the 
processes of WIPO and WTO.  India raised this concern in a letter to the 
WTO:  “Another systemic concern is that IPR negotiations in RTAs and 
plurilateral processes like ACTA completely bypass the existing 
                                                                                                                            
goods, including packaging, bearing without authorization a trademark that is identical to 
the trademark validly registered in respect of such goods, or that cannot be distinguished in 
its essential aspects from such a trademark, and that thereby infringes the rights of the 
owner of the trademark in question under the law of the country in which the procedures 
set out in Section 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Chapter2 are invoked.”). 
24
 Two weeks after WIPO adopted the Development Agenda, United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) Susan Schwab announced that USTR would seek to negotiate 
ACTA in order to “set a new, higher benchmark for enforcement that countries can join on 
a voluntary basis.”  Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
Ambassador Schwab Announces U.S. Will Seek New Trade Agreement to Fight Fakes 
(Oct. 23, 2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/ambassador-schwab-announces-us-will-
seek-new-trade-agreement-fight-fakes; Japan and the European Union made a similar 
announcement.  See Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng & Viviana Muñoz Tellez, The Changing 
Structure and Governance of Intellectual Property Enforcement 25 (South Centre Research 
Paper No. 15, Jan. 2008). 
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multilateral processes.”
25
  Because WIPO is a United Nations organization, 
it is duty bound to pursue development.  One consequence of the 
abandonment of their commitment to multinational decision making is an 
effective abandonment of commitments to pursue the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly.  Response by the leading emerging economies such as India and 
China
26
 cannot be characterised as merely representing national trade 
interests that happen to compete with those of the negotiating countries.  
Instead, countries with emerging economies have many of the world’s 
poorest people, who will be directly impacted by ACTA, living in them.  
For example, India, the world’s most populous democracy, has some 456 
million people living below the poverty line.
27
 
 
C. Limiting Access to Medicine 
 
ACTA threatens access to medicines through the indeterminacy of the 
terms “counterfeit” and “enforcement.”  Similarly problematic are 
provisions that require injunctions against a broad class of actors including 
“a third party over whom the relevant judicial authority exercises 
jurisdiction, to prevent infringing goods from entering into the channels of 
commerce” and requirements that customs officials intercept goods in 
transit, applying the intellectual property law of the transit country.  In the 
current draft of the text, patents are excluded only from Section 3 of 
Chapter 2, which concerns border measures.  The exclusion operates 
through a footnote, raising the question why it is not firmly placed in the 
text.  What is the status of the footnote intended to be?  The wording of the 
footnote itself requires attention:  “For the purpose of this Agreement, 
Parties agree that patents do not fall within the scope of this Section.”  Why 
this circumlocutory language?  Why not simply state that patents do not fall 
within the scope of the section?  The wording suggest that parties may enter 
into other agreements in terms of which the section may apply to patents, 
enabling developed countries to require developing countries to apply the 
provisions of the section to patents in bilateral agreements. 
Even if pharmaceutical patents are ultimately excluded from these 
provisions (an exclusion that is not guaranteed given the lack of 
accountability of the negotiators to elected lawmakers), trademark and 
                                                 
25
 India's Intervention on “TRIPS plus IPR Enforcement” as delivered at the WTO TRIPS 
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copyright claims can be used to block generic medicines. 
For example, earlier this year German customs officials seized and held 
a shipment of the generic drug Amoxicillin which was being shipped 
through Germany to a least developed country.  The drugs were held for 
four weeks apparently because German customs officials were confused by 
the alleged similarity of the generic name Amoxicillin with the 
GlaxoSmithKlein brand Amoxil.
28
  The incident usefully highlights the 
negative consequences for global health when customs authorities are 
empowered and required to engage in determinations of intellectual 
property rights in respect of goods in transit. 
How these provisions and subsequent developments will affect access to 
medicines can be seen through two instances of the enforcement agenda in 
the developing world:  the East African experience of new counterfeit 
legislation, and the Dutch seizure of generic drugs in transit.  The East 
African countries of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda rely on generic drugs.
29
  
Efforts by a group claiming a World Health Organisation mandate and the 
European Union have resulted in “anti-counterfeiting” legislation in 
Tanzania and Kenya and a legislative process in Uganda.  The International 
Medical Product Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT) is described by 
the World Health Organisation secretariat as “a partnership comprised of all 
the major anti-counterfeiting players, including:  international 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, enforcement agencies, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers associations and drug and regulatory 
authorities.”
30
  Historically, counterfeiting has referred to an intentional 
violation of exclusive trademark rights on a commercial scale.  However, in 
East Africa, legislation or draft legislation defines counterfeiting as 
infringement, including unintentional infringement, of not only trademark, 
but also other intellectual property rights  including copyright and patent.
31
  
The Kenyan legislation defines goods as “counterfeit” if they infringe an 
intellectual property right “in Kenya or elsewhere.”  The consequence is 
that even if a trademark or patent is not registered in Kenya goods which 
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allegedly infringe such a right elsewhere in the world may be subject to an 
injunction or seizure.  This represents a marked departure from the general 
rule of territoriality for copyright, trademarks and patents that they have 
effect only within the jurisdiction that grants the right. 
On 23 April 2010, the Kenyan Constitutional Court suspended the 
application of the Act with respect to medicines, as it bans import and 
manufacture of generic medicines, and so infringes constitutional rights.
32
  
The campaign to pass the legislation involved claims that the legislation is 
necessary to prevent sub-standard medicines and other defective and even 
dangerous goods.
33
  Typically, the legislation requires the state to devote 
resources to create agencies or change the emphasis and power of existing 
agencies, constitutes unknowing infringement as a criminal offense. 
ACTA explicitly requires countries to enable customs officials to seize 
goods in transit at the behest of purported rights holders.  The provision 
appears to be based on European regulations that have already been used to 
intercept generic medicines in transit.
34
 
European Council Regulations
35
 have been used on a number of 
occasions by Dutch customs authorities to stop the transit of generic 
medicines lawfully produced in India, on to be lawfully imported into 
developing countries, that happen to be passing through European facilities.  
In transit, seizures negate the freedom of transit guaranteed by Article 5 of 
the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
36
  The Doha 
Declaration allows countries to manufacture, export, and import generic 
medicine under compulsory licenses under certain circumstances.  The 
Dutch customs authorities, apparently unable or unwilling to parse the 
complexities seized the medicines unlawfully.
37
 
Experiences of the enforcement agenda in practise show that aspects of 
that agenda embedded in ACTA, including the seizure of goods in transit 
and an expansive notion of “counterfeit” already impede access to 
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medicines for people in developing countries. 
 
D. Limiting Access to Knowledge 
 
The policy space for developing countries was massively reduced by 
TRIPS, which requires what it terms “minimum standards” of intellectual 
property protection.  Developed countries have generally complied, as 
borne out by research findings from Africa that “in many cases, the African 
countries studied provide even greater protection than international legal 
norms require.”
38
 
TRIPS imposed obligations on developing countries to pass and adhere 
to laws based not on the conditions prevailing in developing countries, but 
rather according to the requirements of trade offices in developed countries 
acting on the behest of certain corporate constituencies. 
 
Perhaps the most important revelation from this research is that 
copyright laws in all study countries comply with international 
copyright standards.  In many cases, the African countries 
studied provide even greater protection than international legal 
norms require.  Thus, the countries studied do not need advice 
or assistance in drafting legislation to bring levels of legal 
protection up to par.  Simply put, Africa does not need stronger 
copyright laws.  Realising this point is urgent, as some of the 
study countries—Kenya, Ghana, South Africa—are in the 
midst of revising, or planning revisions, to their copyright 
laws.
39
 
 
In these circumstances it is not surprising, then, if intellectual property 
legislation and practise diverge in developing countries.  Research in Africa 
found that: 
 
Access to learning materials is obtained primarily through 
activities that infringe copyright.  When—and if—the 
enforcement of sanctions against copyright violation becomes a 
greater reality in the study countries, then, without mechanisms 
in place to promote and ensure non-infringing access to 
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knowledge, many learners, particularly at the tertiary level, will 
be in a precarious position and entire systems of education will 
be vulnerable.
40
 
 
ACTA will require precisely the enforcement that will cut off access to 
learning materials in such countries.  While TRIPS constrains what 
exceptions and limitations to exclusive rights a country may make it does 
not set out minimum exceptions, instead rendering the entire process of 
writing exceptions and limitations far more complex than it was for 
developed countries, which were free to create whatever exceptions they 
deemed appropriate during their own development.  Because of the speed 
with which developing countries are expected to create complex intellectual 
property legislation—legislation that has been developed over centuries by 
developed countries—most developing countries have not developed 
appropriate balancing provisions that enable access to knowledge.  As a 
result, infringement in developing countries, even widespread infringement, 
is a symptom of a system imposed from outside, not suitable or even 
meaningful to many in developing world.
41
  Enforcement required by 
ACTA will deprive millions of people of their only viable access to 
knowledge. 
 
E. The Effect of Border Measures on Developing Country Exports 
 
Broadly drafted border measures will enable global corporations to exert 
pressure on developing country exporters, either barring them access to 
markets or extracting licensing fees from them.  This is illustrated by a 
campaign by Monsanto to prevent the importation of soymeal from 
Argentina into Europe.  Monsanto had obtained a so-called “gene patent” in 
Europe and the United States, which enabled it to exercise a monopoly over 
the supply of a particular type of soybean for agricultural use.
42
  Monsanto 
did not obtain a patent in Argentina, where crops of the bean where 
processed to produced soymeal.  Some of the soymeal was imported into 
Europe.  After a number of years without protest, Monsanto requested 
detainment of shipments of the soymeal into Denmark, the Netherlands, 
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Spain, and United Kingdom and made damages claims against European 
importers of the meal.  The claims were based on alleged violation of the 
patent because it was alleged that the patented DNA sequences would, or 
could, survive in the meal, even though the meal could not be used to grow 
a new crop of beans.  None of cases brought by Monsanto have succeeded, 
with a number of setbacks by courts that have rejected the claim that the 
patent could prevent the importation of an end product of the patent. 
However, in the interim, the customs officials had seized and delayed the 
shipments and charged the importers detainment fees. 
Even if patents are excluded from the ACTA section on border 
measures, patent holders will be enabled to obtain the range of other 
remedies required by ACTA. As the actions of Monsanto in respect of 
Argentinian soy meal shows a strategic use of alleged intellectual property 
rights, even when those rights are not ultimately held by courts to apply to 
products further along a value chain to the object of the rights, can create 
considerable barriers to market entry by developing country farmers. 
The campaign shows the potential of border measures for anti-
competitive action.  Intermediaries such as importers are likely to avoid 
such conflicts even if the law is not clear, switching to new sources, most 
likely those who have made strategic use of broad border measures.  The 
result is for developing country farmers who lack the resources to fight 
sophisticated legal battles on foreign terrain is that they will lose markets 
for their goods, with potentially devastating effects on rural economies. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The impact of ACTA on developing countries is intended to be far 
reaching, taking into its scope different types of intellectual property, 
including a range of measures including civil and criminal penalties, border 
and information gathering requirements, and mandatory government speech 
in favour of entrenched intellectual property regimes.  As a consequence, it 
is not possible to fully describe the likely impact of ACTA.  However, an 
examination of other instances of the enforcement agenda, of which ACTA 
is merely one vehicle, leaves little doubt about the consequences for the 
world’s poor if ACTA proceeds. 
Table 1 lists some of the likely impacts of ACTA on development: 
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Table 1.  Likely Effects of ACTA on Development 
Short Term Medium Term Long Term 
• Interception in 
transit of 
medicines  
• Anti-competitive 
blocking of exports 
to developed 
countries  
• Pressure to prevent 
infringement that 
gives access to 
learning materials 
• Pressure to adopt 
ACTA type 
measure pre 
signature of ACTA 
• Recruitment of some 
Developing Counties to 
support ACTA  
• Diversion of resources to 
“enforcement”  
• Decreased access to 
knowledge due to measures 
in force in developed 
countries  
• Disruptive restructuring of 
global trade routes  
• Decreased access to export 
markets/growing barriers to 
international trade  
• Recruitment of public and 
private security sector as new 
enforcement constituency 
• Undermining of fragile 
civil liberties and rule of 
law  
• Local political 
economies of rent 
seeking “enforcement”  
• Institutionalization of 
enforcement agenda  
• Loss of policy space 
remaining under TRIPS  
• Restrictions on access to 
medicines, access to 
learning materials and 
technology transfer cause 
development failure 
leading to political 
instability 
 
Many of the effects cannot be avoided by developing countries simply 
by refusing to accede to a treaty resulting from the ACTA process but 
instead will directly from implementation of ACTA itself by the club of 
drafting countries.  Some of the effects, such as undermining the WIPO 
Development Agenda and sidelining the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation and the World Trade Organisation, are already under way.  
The most immediate impact of ACTA is that the leadership of many of the 
world's largest democracies, including Brazil and India, are shut out of the 
ACTA process while it is being negotiated even though it will be imposed 
on them later.  That the treaty is being negotiated largely in secret makes it 
difficult for developing countries with limited resources to track the 
process, and even harder to respond to it through diplomatic channels. 
In the short term developing countries will continue to experience the 
effects of the enforcement through the interception of goods in transit 
including generic medicines. In the medium term developing countries 
would come under increasing trade pressure to adopt wide ranging “anti-
counterfeiting” measures which threaten access to medicines and access to 
learning materials. In the long term developing countries would come under 
increasing pressure to agree to ACTA and in so doing devote scarce 
resources to furthering the commercial interests of a small but exceptionally 
powerful group of multinational corporations, depriving their poorest 
inhabitants of access to medicines and learning materials. 
